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All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.1

∗

Professor of Law, Stetson University College of Law. I am grateful for the feedback I received
from and interaction with the other participants in this symposium, including David Bogen, Ellen
Connally, Gwen Jordan, William Rich, Michael Ross, and William Wiecek. I am particularly
grateful for the guidance and encouragement of Dick Aynes. In addition, related aspects of this
project have benefited from the feedback of participants at forums and presentations at the 2008
Midwest Political Science Association, the William S. Boyd School of Law (UNLV), and the
Midwest Law & Society Retreat held by the Institute for Legal Studies at the University of
Wisconsin Law School. This project is generously supported by a research grant from the Stetson
University College of Law.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The first sentence is commonly known as the Citizenship
Clause and the first part of the second sentence as the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For
background on the framing and initial treatment of these clauses, see Richard L. Aynes, Unintended
Consequences of the Fourteenth Amendment and What They Tell Us About Its Interpretation, 39
AKRON L. REV. 289, 290-300 (2006).
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Consider the first sentence of section one of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The non-legal reader might quite reasonably say that such
an introductory and framing sentence indicates that the Amendment is
about citizenship. Such a reading would be reinforced by moving to the
second sentence, which gives lexical priority to the concepts of
citizenship privileges and immunities in its list of protected areas. And
the reader who bothered to go deeper into the Amendment—indeed,
deeper than many lawyers and law professors ever do—would surely
find confirmation of the importance of citizenship in the second section
(addressing citizenship in its somewhat convoluted linkage between
congressional apportionment and the voting rights of black male
citizens),2 and the third section (enforcing a form of citizenship
allegiance by barring members of the confederacy who had previously
served in the government of the United States or any state from serving
in any state or federal position after the war).3 The reader might even
note that citizenship continues to be the topic of the ensuing amendment,
ratified only two years later, which more directly prohibited abridgment
on the basis of race of “[t]he right of citizens” to vote.4
But constitutional law is not a normal, reasonable enterprise.
Sections two and three of the Fourteenth Amendment, being more
political than legal enactments, have had essentially no judicial or legal
development.5 Yet even the first sentence of section one and the ensuing
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. This section was a compromise designed by congressional
Republicans to prevent southern whites from denying suffrage to blacks under state laws while also
gaining more seats in Congress by claiming African-Americans in the numeric calculations for
apportionment, which would have resulted in greater southern white dominance in the House of
Representatives than was true before the Civil War, when enslaved blacks counted as three-fifths of
a person for apportionment purposes. Such a goal could have been achieved by simply basing
representation on the number of qualified voters in each state. That, however, would have forced
northern states to choose between enfranchising women and unnaturalized immigrants or having a
smaller proportionate representation, especially as white men migrated west. The particularly
convoluted, race-based language of the Amendment protected northern interests while preventing an
immediate southern democratic resurgence. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 at 252 (1988). It also caused an almost irreparable rift
between advocates of women’s suffrage and the Republican party by specifying protection only for
male suffrage. Id. at 255.
3. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 3. This section also enabled Congress to remove this
disability by two-thirds vote. Id. Congress did so in 1872. See Act of May 22, 1872, ch. 193, 17
Stat. 142 (removing political disabilities imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment). This section was
generally considered a mild punishment for confederates, replacing as it did a disenfranchisement of
confederates through 1870. FONER, supra note 2, at 253-54.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §1.
5. The Supreme Court did refer to section two in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 41-57
(1974) (upholding state disqualification of former felons from voting and citing section two as
lending implied support for this position).
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Privileges or Immunities Clause have had relatively little play in the
courts. With the single exception of the 1999 case of Saenz v. Roe,6 the
citizenship language of the Fourteenth Amendment has practically no
legal significance.
A few scholars have suggested ways of building some meaning
around the citizenship ideas. Akhil Amar, for instance, has argued that
the Citizenship Clause establishes that everyone born in the United
States is “a free and equal citizen” and it helps empower the federal
government “to dismantle the various nongovernmental structures of
inequality that threatened the amendment’s vision of equal citizenship.”7
Rebecca Zietlow, carefully developing an idea first explored by Kenneth
Karst,8 has argued that equal citizenship under the reconstruction
amendments carries with it “rights of belonging.”9 Such rights, Zietlow
contends, are “more encompassing than the term ‘civil rights,’ [and]
includ[e] rights that historically were not considered to be civil rights
such as economic and social rights[.]”10 This idea of belonging is meant
to capture and help “ensure inclusion, participation, and equal
membership in our diverse national community.”11
These ways of thinking about Fourteenth-Amendment citizenship
do much to expand our understanding of the amendment and the

6. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). Saenz may be the exception that proves the rule. In that case the
Court used both the Citizenship Clause and the Privilege or Immunities Clause to ground a
constitutional right to travel, specifically the right of citizens to move into another state and be
treated equal to those already residing there. Id. at 502-03 (quoting both clauses). While courts and
commentators sometimes mistakenly state that the Saenz Court relied on only the Privileges or
Immunities Clause, the Citizenship Clause also played a significant role in the Court’s analysis. Id.
at 506-07. First, this right was already well established. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). The Saenz court
was simply reaffirming it and giving it specific textual grounding and so did no new work. Second,
this right to equal treatment for new residents appears to be as far as the Court is willing to venture.
By using the two citizenship clauses for so narrow a right, the Court in fact restricted them by
narrow application even as it appeared to invigorate them. Lawrence Tribe seems to have been
proven right that Saenz is more the limited product of a federalism-influenced Court than a wellspring for new constitutional rights. Lawrence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges
or Immunities Revival Portend the Future – or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 Harv. L.
Rev. 110, 197-98 (1999).
7. AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 381-82 (2005).
8. See KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1989).
9. REBECCA E. ZIETLOW, ENFORCING EQUALITY: CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 6 (2006).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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potential for governmental action at all levels.12 For example, a right of
belonging arguably supports government programs that seek to develop
and enforce a robust understanding of welfare rights, something that the
more circumscribed view of traditional individual rights under due
process or equal protection rubrics have failed to do.13 It also refocuses
constitutional thinking away from rights that are primarily individualist
toward a contextualization of individual rights with a focus on inclusion
in a self-defining community in which the very act of inclusion enhances
rights both communal and individual.14
Still, these approaches to equal or constitutional citizenship
represent a starting point, not a conclusion. Taking up the invitations of
these scholars, my project is to delve more deeply into the possible
meanings of constitutional citizenship, but to do so from a different
angle. Somewhat in the tradition of the popular constitutionalism
scholars,15 I propose that the best source for meanings of constitutional
citizenship will come not from traditionally originalist sources but from
those who attempted to redefine citizenship in a more egalitarian and
democratic manner and who established, both in word and in practice,
meanings for citizenship on the ground. To do this, however, I will
borrow a theoretical framework from political and social theory: the
theories of civil society and the public sphere. I do so because I think
they capture—in ways often missed by both legal scholars and
historians—the structure of nineteenth century social experience while at
the same time also connecting this experience to modern notions of
politics and society. After explicating some of the main principles of
civil society and public sphere theory, I will then analyze a particular

12. By “all levels” I means to include all three branches — judicial, legislative, and executive
— as well as federal, state, and local governments. One of the more important aspects of Professor
Zietlow’s approach is that it gives far more legitimacy to congressional actions, and also sets far
more rigorous standards for judging those actions, than do most judicacentric constitutional
theories. See id. I believe a rich theory of constitutional citizenship requires all levels of
governmental activity.
13. E.g., KARST, supra note 8, at 134-46; ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 150-51.
14. KARST, supra note 8, at 189-216.
15. See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNETT, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). Professor Zietlow’s book is in this vein as well,
although she focuses mainly on congressional speakers. See ZIETLOW, supra note 9, at 9, 145-59.
For examples of historical legal scholarship that looks beyond governmental actors, see WILLIAM
FORBATH, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1991); William Forbath,
The New Deal Constitution in Exile, 51 DUKE L.J. 165 (2001); James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth
Amendment versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the Shaping of American Constitutional Law,
1921-1957, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2002).

14-FOX(2).DOC

2009]

7/6/2009 12:07 PM

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT CITIZENSHIP

1249

form of civil society and the public sphere that I think reveals important
aspects of democratic citizenship—the black convention movement. As
we will see, this movement both enacted citizenship on the ground and
engaged in a discourse about citizenship in the public sphere that
presented alternative visions of citizenship. Ultimately this experience
shows how one essential aspect of citizenship is the creations of spaces
for citizenship activities and engagement with the democratic public
sphere.
I. CIVIL SOCIETY, THE PUBLIC SPHERE, AND COUNTERSPHERES
Originating simultaneously in Tocquevillian ideas of voluntary
associations and Hegelian critiques of market capitalism, modern ideas
of civil society stress the public yet non-governmental character of civil
society.16 Robert Post and Nancy Rosenblum, in an analysis of modern
ideas of civil society, have defined it as the realm of social life
characterized by “plural and particularistic identities[,]”—“a zone of
freedom for individuals to associate with others and for groups to shape
their norms” and determine their own goals and operations.17 Whether
the focus is primarily on non-profit, communal voluntary associations,
or on other types of association, ranging from familial to economic
associations, the core idea is that civil society provides an activity-based,
non-governmental arena for citizenship and provides “seedbeds” for a
fully engaged citizenship.18 Civil society theory—even in its very
divergent manifestations19—provides important insight on how
16. On the diverse aspects of civil society evident in Tocqueville and Hegel, see JOHN
EHRENBERG, CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CRITICAL HISTORY OF AN IDEA 121-32 (discussing Hegel), 16069 (1999) (discussing Tocqueville); JEAN L. COHEN & ANDREW ARATO, CIVIL SOCIETY AND
POLITICAL THEORY 91-116 (1992) (discussing Hegel); JEFFREY C. ALEXANDER, THE CIVIL SPHERE
99-101 (2006) (discussing Tocqueville). Hegel’s analysis of civil society arises mainly in G. W. F.
HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 182-256 (Allen W. Wood ed., H. B. Nisbet
trans., 1991). Tocqueville discusses aspects of civil society throughout both volumes of
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 205-223, 590616 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2004).
17. Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post, Introduction to CIVIL SOCIETY AND
GOVERNMENT 1, 3 (Nancy L. Rosenblum & Robert C. Post eds., 2002). Their definition is
structured as a contrast to government, which is “a domain of common purpose and identity.” Id.
18. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society-Revivalists, 75
CHI-KENT L REV 301, 309 (2000) (citing, inter alia, COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOCIETY, A CALL TO CIVIL
SOCIETY: WHY DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS (1998); SEEDBEDS OF VIRTUE: SOURCES OF
COMPETENCE, CHARACTER, AND CITIZENSHIP IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (Mary Ann Glendon & David
Blankenhorn, eds. 1995). See also Rosenblum & Post, supra note 17.
19. Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Foreword: Legal and Constitutional Implications
of the Calls to Revive Civil Society, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 289, 292 (2000) (discussing the variety
of views of civil society).
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democratic citizenship can exist and develop outside the immediate
relations to the state, and thus permits us to see the overlapping nature of
the different aspects of citizenship, whether they be legal status (e.g., a
person is a citizen of the U.S.), political activity (e.g., a person acts as a
citizen when voting), or social (e.g., being a “good citizen” by
contributing to the common good in a tolerant and civil manner). Civil
society theory also has the benefits of being based on a concept
reasonably well known at the time of the initial implementation of the
Reconstruction Amendments—Tocqueville’s Democracy in America
was one of the more popular works of the 1850s20—and as we will see, it
helps frame a better understanding of how citizenship was thought to
exist contextually in the nineteenth century. The history of civil society
therefore provides some opportunity to think more fully about
democratic citizenship in law and culture and to investigate the ways in
which freedom and equality can—and cannot—develop outside and
alongside relations to the state.
Yet its strength is also its weakness: the concept of civil society
often bends too far away from the state, becoming seemingly oblivious
to the government’s role as a representative and agent of the citizenry. It
is therefore also important to attend to the intersections between state
and civil society, for it is here, most of all, where people are citizens.
Just as civil society theory provides a necessary corrective to ideas of
citizenship by orienting us away from the thin conceptualization of
citizenship currently associated with constitutional law, public sphere
theory provides an essential perspective to civil society theory by
orienting us back to the relationship both civil society and the citizen
necessarily have with the state. As Jean Cohen has argued, the concept
of civil society often presumes a focus on the voluntary associations of
private life and omits any consideration of the public sphere or the
integrated relations of government and civic life.21 Theories of the
public sphere correct this omission by centering themselves on precisely
the points where government and civic life intersect. As described by
Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere consists of all places in our society
where “something approaching public opinion can be formed,” whether
in the media, through elections, or in public fora,22 and many of the
20. MATTHEW MANCINI, ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE AND AMERICAN INTELLECTUALS: FROM
HIS TIMES TO OURS ix-x (2006).
21. Jean L. Cohen, American Civil Society Talk, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC
RENEWAL 55-56 (Robert K. Fullinwider ed., 1999).
22. Jürgen Habermas, THE PUBLIC SPHERE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA ARTICLE, reprinted in
CRITICAL THEORY AND SOCIETY: A READER 136 (Stephen Eric Bronner & Douglas MacKay
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actors in such are themselves organizations and structures of civil
society.
As we will see in the ensuing discussion of the battles over freedom
and citizenship in the South after the Civil War, and as is also evident
from the history of the women’s suffrage movement, it is in the public
sphere where claims are made for citizenship, claims made by the
excluded, often using the structures of civil society, who were seeking to
implement and re-define Reconstruction. It is in the public sphere where
individuals come together in groups seeking recognition and rights as
citizens, where the democratic benefits of civil society can be articulated
to the legal and political spheres, where democratic critique can be
maintained, and where political, economic, and social transformations
can take place. While it may be civil society that provides the seedbeds
for citizenship, citizenship qua citizenship can only bloom in the public
sphere, for it is there that people assert their inherent equality and their
status as full citizens, engaged in commerce, entertainment, and public
activity on par with all others. This is why the public sphere was so
hotly contested, defended by whites against claims of equal access by
blacks, delimited by men against the incursions of women, and was
generally the site of battle for equal and free citizenship in the decades
after the Civil War.
Still, despite its more democratizing character, the concept of the
public sphere has been shown to itself be problematic. To the extent that
the concept derives from Habermas’ early construction of a bourgeois
public sphere which prized open debate among social equals and which
assumed a possibility of universalizing as an ideal for democratic society
and democratic discourse, Nancy Fraser has argued persuasively that this
form of public sphere is elitist and exclusionary and certainly not an
adequate site for democratic critique of governmental, economic, or
social subordinations.23 Instead, Fraser and others have pointed to the
need to account for oppositional discourse and activity in the public
spheres constructed within excluded or subordinated communities. With
Kellner eds., 1989) (1964). See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF
PUBLIC SPHERE: AN INQUIRY INTO A CATEGORY OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY (Thomas Burger &
Frederick Lawrence trans., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1989) (1962).
23. Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually
Existing Democracy, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 109 (Craig Calhoun ed., 1992). As
Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer have aptly stated, this bourgeois public sphere is problematic
because the “homogenous class standing of the bourgeoisie engendered a shared vision of the good
that blocked as potential topics of deliberation the arrangements that sustained actual exclusions
from the public sphere.” Robert Asen & Daniel C. Brouwer, Introduction, in COUNTERPUBLICS
AND THE STATE 1, 5 (Robert Asen & Daniel C. Brouwer eds., 2001).

THE
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more historical attention to the development of social movements and
subordinated groups, these scholars have identified “counterpublics” or
“enclaves” in which the democratizing value of the public sphere is
imagined and out of which come claims to citizenship and equality that
in fact reform or transform the concepts themselves.24 Under this vision,
counterpublics are sites where excluded or subordinated groups can
develop and refine counterdiscourses, both to maintain and develop their
own meanings and identities and, importantly, to re-engage the dominant
“public” sphere in a critical discourse. This approach suggests the
possibility of a plural public sphere, or what Robert Asen has described
as a multiplicity of public spheres.25
The move to recognize multiple publics and to validate the publics
and discourses developed in reaction to exclusionary, dominant publics
is critical to being able to understand discourses about democratic
citizenship during and after Reconstruction. As we will see, the
dominant public discourse about citizenship failed to address many of
the fundamental experiences and problems of black citizens, and the
need for black citizens to engage in both public sphere discourse and
alternative public discourses was essential. Yet even the refinement of
public sphere theory to include an essential pluralism remains troubling
if it focuses solely on the externality of counterpublics. Ultimately we
need to be able to follow Jeffrey Alexander and reorient ourselves back
toward civil society and democratic citizenship. Alexander values the
focus on alternative publics of scholars such as Nancy Fraser, but he
argues that these counterpublics, in their most important manifestations
as vibrant social movements, “are oriented not simply toward gaining
resources and power vis-à-vis the civil sphere but to securing a respected
place within it.”26 The universalizing rhetoric of democratic citizenship
and democratic civil society retain, for Alexander, a component of
critique that is lost in an excessive focus on counterpublics as purely
sites of identity and community formation for the purpose of seeking
power. Alexander sees in counterpublic theory a danger of reducing
24. See, e.g., Mary P. Ryan, Gender and Public Access: Women’s Politics in NineteenthCentury America, in HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 23, at 259; Carol C. Gould,
Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCE:
CONTESTING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE POLITICAL 171, 172-76 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996); Geoff
Eley, Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century, in
HABERMAS AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE, supra note 23, at 289; Catherine R. Squires, Rethinking the
Black Public Sphere: An Alternative Vocabulary for Multiple Public Spheres, 12 COMMUNICATION
THEORY 446, 466 (2002).
25. Asen & Brouwer, supra note 23, at 6-10.
26. ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 276.
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counterpublics to countercultures and of falling into the trap of
instrumentalism, of seeing political discourse as a battle of interests to
obtain power rather than as a dynamic process of realizing, albeit
necessarily imperfectly, a universalizing potential that is democratic
civil society.27 What we will then need to examine are ebbs and flows of
this dynamic between the universalizing character of civil society and
citizenship and the particularizing aspects of the necessary and essential
formations of multiple publics and multiple civil spheres.
Theories of civil society and the public sphere therefore offer a
promising language for understanding the experience of constitutional
citizenship in the years of and following Reconstruction, and they can
themselves be rethought or refined by studying the experiences of
claiming and implementing citizenship on the ground. I take up this
period not because of some originalist desire to divine the
understandings or intent of the framers and ratifiers of the
Reconstruction Amendment (although African American understandings
of citizenship are essential to any originalist project since, as Peggy
Cooper Davis and others have has pointed out, the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments were only ratified with the political participation
of black Americans28), but rather because in giving depth to the
meanings of general political and cultural concepts such as citizenship
one needs, I think, to explore the lived experiences of the concept. As
we will see, the experiences of trying to claim, define, and implement a
free and equal citizenship after the war led African Americans and some
white Republicans to enact citizenship on the ground, giving detail to
vague constitutional language. The ensuing battles over citizenship that
took place then identified, in ways that can only happen on the ground,
the key sites and experiences of citizenship, both in the assertions of
citizenship by African Americans and in the denials of that citizenship
by white Democrats.
II. CITIZENSHIP CREATION DURING RECONSTRUCTION: THE LEGAL
RIGHTS OF FREE LABOR
Many scholars follow historian Eric Foner’s lead in arguing that
Reconstruction Republicans adhered to a free labor ideology that

27. Id. at 279.
28. PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES
221 (1997).
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identified freedom primarily with the right to earn wages.29 Thus in the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 Republicans linked citizenship with the rights
to contract and own property, and they repeatedly proclaimed the value
of contract labor arrangements as the apotheosis of the new freedom and
citizenship that they saw themselves granting to blacks.30 While there
may have been a variety of Republican views on how expansive such
rights would be, the basic thrust of congressional ideas of citizenship
was that (male) citizens should have governmental protection of rights to
contract, to buy, sell, and hold property, and to gain access to courts to
protect those rights, all of which implemented the right of citizens to
earn and support themselves with their own labor.
In its specific listing of rights and privileges, the Act asserted and
protected a collection of citizenship rights, including rights of contract,
property, and access to the courts.31 To the modern ear, these are rather
routine; but in the context of post-bellum, post-slavery America their
centrality to creating a fully vibrant free, civil society was more directly
evident. Take, for example, the right to contract. On one level it
secured simply the legal right to transact and enforce agreements. Yet,
in the context of the 1860s, this freedom to contract was fundamental.
The country was developing into a modern force of industrial capitalism,
and contract was one of the legal engines driving this transformation.
Indeed, as Morton Horwitz argued in his classic discussion of the issue,
“[t]he triumph of a contractarian ideology by the middle of the
29. See generally FONER, supra note 2; ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN:
THE IDEOLOGY OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (Oxford University Press
1995) (1970); JAMES D. SCHMIDT, FREE TO WORK: LABOR LAW, EMANCIPATION, AND
RECONSTRUCTION, 1815-1880 (1998); AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE
LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION (1998). I have
previously developed this idea in James W. Fox Jr., Democratic Citizenship and Congressional
Reconstruction: Defining and Implementing the Privileges and Immunities of Citizenship, 13
TEMPLE POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 453, 460-66 (2004).
30. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (protecting the civil rights of United States
citizens). The Act provided:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such
citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United
States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal
benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed
by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to
none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary
notwithstanding.
31. See id.
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nineteenth century enabled mercantile and entrepreneurial groups to
broadly advance their own interests through a transformed system of
private law.”32 Access to contract rights was the ticket to citizenship in
the new capitalist economy. Congressional Republicans, by the very act
of equating basic legal rights with freedom and racial equality, were redefining legal citizenship in a way that incorporated some aspects of the
citizenship of belonging. They were in fact re-creating a political
society in which commercial norms such as free labor and free contract
were the inheritance of each male33 citizen regardless of race, and in
opening citizenship across race, Republicans were redefining citizenship
to mean inclusion in civil society.34
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 also secured property rights.35
Property was integral to self-sufficiency, and the goal of free labor,
ultimately, was some ownership of property, both personal and real. Yet
property, as Eric Foner has observed, represented a key ambiguity
during Reconstruction.36 For white Republicans, property rights
provided a means for securing productive, free-labor agriculture; while
blacks might develop ownership of farms and plantations, the land itself
was seen as primarily a productive resource that would replicate, in
agricultural form, northern capitalism. For the former slaves, on the
other hand, land ownership created a zone of independence and privacy,
a place where they need not work for former-masters at depressed wages
but could instead become self-sufficient, secure in their homes and their
families, while also providing a means to bargain up wages for the labor
they chose to sell.37
These differing views of property also reflected fundamental
differences regarding civil society. For northern Republicans, civil
society focused significantly on the steering of labor toward economic

32. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 211
(1977).
33. It is of course vital to state that the citizen ideal was, at this point, purely masculine for the
male actors of Reconstruction. Although feminists had well articulated, in the Declaration of
Sentiments and elsewhere, the inherent hypocrisy and intellectual illegitimacy of making
universalizing claims to a gendered definition of citizenship, such a counter-discourse was yet to
affect the dominant male discourse. This topic will require a much fuller exposition in what I
expect to be a book on this topic; for now I merely note its importance. On the importance of
contract ideology, contract-as-metaphor, and the inherent tensions between those and gender
subordination during this period, see AMY DRU STANLEY, supra note 29.
34. On inclusion as an aspect of citizenship, see KARST, supra note 8, at 189-216.
35. See Act of April 9, 1866, supra note 30.
36. See FONER, supra note 2, at 54.
37. See id. (discussing the dilemmas of the free labor ideology during Reconstruction).
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productivity.38 This vision and commitment would be sorely tested in
the coming decades as labor developed its own views of civil society
through labor unions and battled with many in the Republican Party,
who shifted toward a predominantly industry- and business-oriented idea
of civil society.39 But in the 1860s it was still possible to maintain an
egalitarian vision of free labor in which civil society and industrial labor
were seen as unified.
For southern blacks, however, wage labor seemed anathema to
democratic civil society. The civil rights of contract and property were
instead means of protecting and developing counterweights in civil
society to the oppressions of post-slavery economic and political
structures. Through the ownership of land and protections of access to
the courts and enforcement of contracts, blacks could, it was thought,
carve out spheres for families and churches, benevolent and economic
associations, schools and newspapers, and could generally build
community supports for their newly acquired legal citizenship.40
While the visions of civil society imagined by northern whites and
southern blacks varied substantially, both understood that legal rights
and legal citizenship helped create the possibility of black participation
in civil society.41 It is important to see both the transformative and the
restrictive aspects of the dominant citizenship discourse of
Reconstruction. On one level Reconstruction really did present a radical
transformation to ideas and realities of citizenship. The democratizing
ideals of the Jacksonian era, in which white laborers had become full
citizens and the right to labor, contract, and property were claimed to be
open to all classes,42 merged with abolitionist ideals of racial equality.
Legal rights were the site of communal transformation that had not been
possible before 1865 in either the slaveholding south or in the Jim Crow
north.43 Yet this transformation only occurred with the assurances of

38. See infra note 39.
39. On these issues, see generally FORBATH, supra note 15; DAVID MONTGOMERY, CITIZEN
WORKER: THE EXPERIENCE OF WORKERS IN THE UNITED STATES WITH DEMOCRACY AND THE FREE
MARKET DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (1993).
40. See FONER, supra note 2, at 54 ("As Northern investors understood the term, 'free labor'
meant working for wages on plantations; to blacks it meant farming their own land, and living
largely independent of the marketplace."). See also id. at 364-79.
41. See id. at 370-73.
42. See, e.g., Theda Skocpol, The Tocqueville Problem: Civic Engagement in American
Democracy, 21 SOC. SCI. HIST. 455, 460 (1997) (drawing connections between Jacksonianism,
expanded suffrage, and Tocquevillian associationalism).
43. On the segregationist and white supremacist nature of northern antebellum society, see
LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE STATES, 1790-1860 (1961).
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limitations. In 1866 there was no place for black suffrage in the claim to
full citizenship, and certainly no space for “social” citizenship, for equal
access to public spaces in a way that would accord full civil status to
black citizens. For these claims to break into citizenship discourse, the
dominant public sphere would need a new discourse constructed from
other public spaces, spaces where subordinated black voices could use
the freedoms and rights of their newly acquired first-level citizenship to
press for the continued transformation of citizenship and civil society.
III. CREATING A BLACK CIVIL SOCIETY AND PUBLIC SPHERE: THE
BLACK CONVENTION MOVEMENT
Free labor citizenship was one of the dominant ideas of free
citizenship present during Reconstruction, but it was predominantly an
ideal advanced by northern elites (white and black) and was not
necessarily the ideal for all freed blacks.44 This is evident from the very
start of the post-war period. African-American men had been meeting in
national conventions since before the Civil War, and many black men,
from both the North and the South, met at national and state conventions
after the war.45 These conventions were significant civic and citizenship
acts on a number of levels. First, they demonstrated the remarkable
commitment to active engagement with civil society in just the way that
Tocqueville had identified as a crucial aspect of the American brand of
democratic citizenship.46 By engaging in this culturally valorized means
of association and expression, black Americans enacted political
citizenship through the public sphere despite their disenfranchisement
throughout most of the country.47 Through the type of group activity
common to large associations—committee work, drafting resolutions,
debating proposals, compromising, balancing competing interests,
building coalitions—participants in these conventions could engage in
the activities of democratic citizenship. And often the conventions

44. See FONER, supra note 2, at 289.
45. Philip S. Foner and George E. Walker performed a tremendous service in compiling the
materials from the state and national black conventions of the 19th century. See 1 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979)
[hereinafter 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865]; 1 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK NATIONAL AND STATE
CONVENTIONS, 1865-1890 (Philip S. Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1986) [hereinafter 1
PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890].
46. See, e.g., TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 16, at 215-23 (discussing political associations), 604609 (discussing civil and political associations).
47. Of course first generation feminists had also invoked this social/political practice, most
prominently in the 1849 Seneca Falls Convention that produced the Declaration of Sentiments.
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produced formal political activity by sending petitions to Congress, the
President, or to the general citizen.48 These conventions reveal how
important the overlapping nature of citizenship can be, and how
important the public sphere and civil society are for the engagement in
and claim for full citizenship status. The very act of claiming citizenship
through public discourse in voluntary associations itself defined the
nature of that citizenship and helped eventually to transform that
citizenship into a recognition of political citizenship more broadly by the
dominant society.
This final point bears emphasis. When the citizenship activity of
Reconstruction is viewed primarily as that of congressional actions, as
the writing of legislation or the drafting of constitutional amendments,
then citizenship remains passive. It is a thing granted, not claimed or
asserted. While the egalitarian nature of this grant was indeed radical
for the time and essential to any future development of full democratic
citizenship, it was the claiming of citizenship by African Americans that
reveals the full potential of citizenship activity.49 The state and national
conventions of African Americans thus represent a crucial and defining
aspect of a more vibrant, active, and realizable citizenship.
African American conventions also defined citizenship through
their specific articulations of the meaning of citizenship and freedom. In
numerous meetings and conventions of freedmen meeting at the end of
the Civil War, black Americans expressed their own understandings of
freedom and full citizenship by stating their expectations and demands
of whites in what would be, they hoped, a new country.50 Full access to
American citizenship meant something very real and specific. Freed
blacks certainly wanted access to the basic legal rights such as contract
and property ownership; the free labor ideal of legal citizenship held a
prominent place in African American articulations of citizenship,
especially in the earlier conventions of 1865 and 1866 which were
dominated by men who had been free before the war and possessed
some property.51 Yet even in the early conventions the citizenship
claims were more encompassing and fuller.

48. Eric Foner, Rights and the Constitution in Black Life during the Civil War and
Reconstruction, 74 J. AM. HIST. 863, 867-69 (1987).
49. See ELIZABETH REGOSIN, FREEDOM’S PROMISE: EX-SLAVE FAMILIES AND CITIZENSHIP IN
THE AGE OF EMANCIPATION (2002).
50. See generally 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 45; 1 PROCEEDINGS 1865-1890,
supra note 45.
51. FONER, supra note 2, at 112.
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Just as critical to the claim of citizenship through civil rights of
contract and property were the uniform arguments of black conventions
to assert a right to the franchise as fundamental to any meaningful
citizenship or freedom.52 Congress had famously temporized on black
suffrage in the debates over the Fourteenth Amendment, as Radical
Republicans did not appear to have the votes to achieve it.53 Each
convention focused on calls for Congress to grant and protect the right of
black citizens to vote, often pointing out that their citizenship-claim to
suffrage, as loyal citizens who fought for the Union, were plainly greater
than those of the former Confederate soldiers.54 It was also clear to
these convention members that the other rights could be rendered
meaningless without access to political powers. For black Americans
during Reconstruction, access to civil society and political activity went
hand-in-hand, and unlike the progression in Congress where civil rights
came first, for African Americans the ballot was seen as the more
important right, on which all others could depend.55 As John Mercer
Langston, one of the leading African-American legal and political
thinkers and activists, stated, suffrage was more fundamental than even
the basic civil rights of property and contract because it was central to
self-government and free institutions, and was “a constituent element of
manhood; . . . it stands prominent among the chief duties of civil society
to sustain and guard it.”56

52. See, e.g., 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890, supra note 45, at 80 (discussing the Norfolk
Convention of 1865), at 81 (discussing “Address From the Colored Citizens of Norfolk, Va., to the
People of the United States”); FONER, supra note 2, at 180 (discussing the Raleigh Convention of
1865). See also Foner, supra note 48, at 872-73.
53. FONER, supra note 2, at 251-61; Xi Wang, Black Suffrage and the Redefinition of
American Freedom, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2153, 2179-95 (1995-1996).
54. See, e.g., 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840-1865 302 (Philip S.
Foner & George E. Walker eds., 1979) [hereinafter 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865].
55. Id.; see also FONER, supra note 2, at 289.
56. JOHN MERCER LANGSTON, FREEDOM AND CITIZENSHIP 110 (Mnemosyne Publishing
1969) (1883). For Langston, and for other men advocating black rights during this period,
“manhood” was often used synonymously with citizenship. E.g., Address of the Colored State
Convention to the People of the State of South Carolina, in 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note
54, at 299. The fact that the idea of citizenship was so often described in expressly gendered terms
reveals some of the dangers inherent in this concept, and certainly the dangers in not carefully
regarding the context of historical uses of the concept. On the problem of citizenship defined as
“manhood,” see NANCY ISENBERG, SEX AND CITIZENSHIP IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA 191-204
(1998). On the construction of a specifically African-American idea of manhood, see the essays in
1 A QUESTION OF MANHOOD: A READER IN U.S. BLACK MEN’S HISTORY AND MASCULINITY
(Darlene Clark Hine & Earnestine Jenkins eds., 1999); 2 A QUESTION OF MANHOOD: A READER IN
U.S. BLACK MEN’S HISTORY AND MASCULINITY (Darlene Clark Hine & Earnestine Jenkins eds.,
2001).
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But just as political rights were critical for the protection of civil
society, so too was civil society critical in the claim for political rights.
Eric Foner has observed that one of the main reasons that black suffrage
was on the national agenda after the war—given that northern whites
had not previously seen black suffrage as important—was the
persistence and skill of blacks from New Orleans in petitioning Congress
to address the issue.57 In particular, the Creole community had a history
of developed civil society in an enclave of freedom before the war.
They had established a wide range of civil activities, from schools to
orphanages to a free press to successful businesses, all of which
supported a vocal and active political community. This enabled
representatives of the community to present, in person, forceful
arguments on behalf of black suffrage in ways that northern whites were
compelled to take seriously.58
One of the most striking examples of these issues came from South
Carolina Freedmen’s Convention, meeting in Charleston at the Zion
Presbyterian Church in November 1865.59 First, the participants
recognized the full breadth of the communal and personal experiences at
issue when they stated that they gathered “to deliberate upon our
intellectual, moral, industrial, civil, and political condition.”60 Notice
that this was not a matter of isolating civil rights from political rights, or
civil and political from economic, education, or moral rights and duties;
the type of isolated parsing of layers of citizenship that Congress would
engage in early 1866 made little sense to the men who were claiming
freedom and citizenship from a history of bondage.
This point was reinforced through the language the convention used
to describe what had been denied in slavery and what was required in
freedom: “Heretofore we have had no avenues opened to us or our
57. Foner, supra note 48, at 867-69.
58. Id. A similar point could be made about northern free blacks who had developed a
nascent, enclave-like civil society that included black churches (especially the A.M.E. Church) and
a black press in the north as part of the black abolitionist movement. These civil society
organizations and activities helped fuel both the abolitionist movement and the subsequent
movement for black citizenship and suffrage. On antebellum northern black society generally, see
PATRICK RAEL, BLACK IDENTITY & BLACK PROTEST IN THE ANTEBELLUM NORTH (2002); JAMES
OLIVER HORTON & LOIS E. HORTON, IN HOPE OF LIBERTY: CULTURE, COMMUNITY, AND PROTEST
AMONG NORTHERN FREE BLACKS, 1700-1860 (1997); LITWACK, supra note 43; JANE H. PEASE &
WILLIAM H. PEASE, THEY WHO WOULD BE FREE: BLACKS’ SEARCH FOR FREEDOM, 1830-1861
(1974).
59. For the South Carolina Convention of 1865 discussed here, see 2 PROCEEDINGS, 18401865, supra note 54, at 286-304.
60. Id. at 298 (discussing “Address of the Colored State Convention to the People of the State
of South Carolina”).
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children—we have had no firesides that we could call our own; none of
those incentives to work hard for the development of our minds and the
aggrandizement of our race in common with other people.”61 This
describes not just a desire to have access to property and contract rights,
but a fuller context in which those rights are implemented or denied.
This is a claim not for rights in and of themselves so much as for rights
as opportunities (“avenues”); not to the right of free labor for individual
economic benefit but for intellectual and communal development
(“development of our minds and the aggrandizement of our race”).62
This latter point in particular shows how individual and communal were
understood together, how they were more integrated than classical
liberal ideology and free labor ideology would indicate. The desire of
freed blacks to be free of white control meant that “autonomy” for
blacks consisted of “autonomy both as individuals and as members of a
community.”63 Whereas whites often talked of autonomy or freedom in
more individualized terms, there was a clear communal consciousness in
claims of autonomy and freedom by blacks. In this respect, civil society
and citizenship claims by blacks should be seen as much more able to
unify individualistic and communal concepts.
Yet it would be a mistake to see in the communal conceptions of
Reconstruction-Era blacks a rigid separatism along racial lines that
inhibited understandings of broader democratic community and
citizenship. In several of the black conventions, delegates debated issues
of race-consciousness and separatism. For example, in Pennsylvania the
delegates debated whether to condemn black merchants who do not treat
black customers equally to white customers, ultimately deciding that
preferential treatment of white customers was against their principle of
equality, even if opposing such preferences entailed some economic
sacrifice by black merchants.64 Black delegates were beginning to work
out an issue that they could only address fully in the black public sphere:
the relative role and value of race-based community building versus
race-neutral claims of individualized equality. It was these debates that
helped build a base for how biracial legislatures during Reconstruction
would approach issues of social equality. Separate schools were often
supported by black communities and Reconstruction legislatures in
states that had substantial black legislative participation during
61. Id. at 298-99.
62. Id.
63. Foner, supra note 48, at 870.
64. 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890 supra note 45, at 147-48 (discussing the Proceedings of
Pennsylvania Convention, 1865).
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Reconstruction, such as South Carolina and Mississippi.65 Yet these
legislatures also advocated and passed laws desegregating public
accommodations, and objected to laws requiring segregated schools.66
For black leaders during Reconstruction, racial separation and racebased social communities were part of a pluralistic, as opposed to a
racialized, conception of American democracy. Race mattered, and
racial improvement and consciousness could be harnessed in a positive
way, yet the public and legal understanding of persons, that is,
citizenship was itself not racialized. As Eric Foner has written, “while
most blacks valued [their] autonomous institutions and did not object to
voluntary racial separation, they insisted the state must remain colorblind.”67 This was a conception of citizenship that was at once
aspirational about the promise of de-racialized equality and grounded in
a recognition of the reality of racialized communities.
The South Carolina convention went on to frame these rights of
citizenship in a larger context of civil society. In a statement to the
United States Senate and House, the South Carolina convention listed
the rights and privileges that they expected the federal government to
secure, including: a right to receive protection of law and government
(“the strong arm of law and order”), a right to protect laborers’ ability to
sell labor just as merchants sell their goods, a right to fair consideration
of their claims on the “land question” (a reference, no doubt, to General
Sherman’s forty-acre-and-a-mule land grant, reversed by President
Johnson68), and a right to bear arms on a basis equal to whites.69 These
rights themselves seem consistent with rights recognized by
congressional Republicans, even if Republicans failed to secure the land
grants. But the members of the convention also claimed more than these
basic legal rights. Like all other black conventions of the period, they
asserted a right to suffrage, citing the injustice of being taxed without
representation and the need to have suffrage to protect against unjust

65. FONER, supra note 2, at 365-68. Foner cites some instances, such as in New Orleans,
where integrated schools were sustained for some period of Reconstruction, but for the most part he
finds that African-Americans were more interested in establishing public education in the first place
than in pressing for integrated education.
66. Id. at 368-70.
67. Id. at 372.
68. On the Sherman land grant and the forty-acres-and-a-mule idea, see generally CLAUDE F.
OUBRE, FORTY ACRES AND A MULE: THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND BLACK LAND OWNERSHIP
(1978).
69. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 302 (discussing “Memorial to the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress Assembled” in South Carolina,
1865).
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laws, reflecting a view consistent with John Mercer Langston’s
articulation of suffrage as a threshold right.70 Thus in South Carolina, as
in Louisiana and elsewhere, blacks participating in a black public sphere
responded to congressional hesitancy with their own re-definition of
basic citizenship rights.
The South Carolina convention went beyond this, however, and
began developing an exploration of citizenship rights even broader than
one connecting suffrage and basic civil rights. In their statement to
Congress the delegates also asserted a right to secure “the three great
agents of civilized society—the school, the pulpit, the press[.]”71 Here
we see most plainly a claim to civil society—or what they refer to as
civilized society—in which education, religion, and the press are as
fundamental to basic citizenship and freedom as first order legal rights
and suffrage. This statement echoes Tocquevillian ideas that civil
society in a democracy is composed of a range of activities (rather than
merely voluntary associations).72 The delegates to the South Carolina
convention evidently understood that they were situated within a legal,
political, and civil society, and that access to all spheres of social and
political engagement were important in a broad nexus of activities of
civil society. This view is further evident in their assertion of a right to
engage in political discourse in open-access political conventions in
which all citizens could debate the fulfillment of what they describe as
basic rights “to enter upon all avenues of agriculture, commerce, [and]
trade; to amass wealth by thrift and industry; [and] the right to develop
our whole being by all the appliances that belong to civilized
society[.]”73
This final phrase—“develop our whole being by all the appliances
that belong to civilized society”—aptly characterizes how the
convention understood the situatedness of the individual rights. It

70. Id.; see also LANGSTON, supra note 56, at 110.
71. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 302 (discussing “Memorial to the Senate
and House of Representatives of the United States, in Congress Assembled” in South Carolina in
1865).
72. Tocqueville discusses a range of components of civil society, including press (Book I,
chapter 11), political associations (Book I, chapter 12), public associations (Book II, chapter 5), and,
to some extent, religion (Book II, chapters 9 & 12). See Tocqueville, supra note 16. On the
importance of understanding that Tocqueville’s analysis of civil society was both broader than
voluntary associations and also somewhat critical of such associations, see Robert T. Gannett, Jr.,
Bowling Ninepins in Tocqueville’s Township, 97 AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REV. 1, 1-2 (2003)
and Keith E. Whittington, Revisiting Tocqueville’s America, 42 AMERICAN BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST
21, 21-24 (1998).
73. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54 at 291, 302.
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connects self-realization (“develop our whole being”) with the structures
of civil society (“the appliances that belong to civilized society”). It also
employs a double meaning that unites individual African Americans to
the African American community by referring to “our whole being.”
This message to Congress reflects a radical joining of traditionally
liberal ideas of legal rights, emerging ideas of suffrage rights, and an as
yet under-developed idea of the spheres of civil society—including
education, commerce, labor, religion, and the press, among others—as
necessary components to full development of citizenship and
personhood.
In conjunction with many of the black state and national
conventions, black southerners were also forming local and state Equal
Rights Associations. Several of the state conventions specifically
referred to the associations as the organizational arms to carry out the
proposals and projects discussed and supported by the convention
delegates.74 Equal Rights Associations and Union Leagues took the
ideals of the black conventions—the claims for equal legal rights,
political activity, education, labor rights, and public welfare—to the
local level. Equal Rights Associations and Union Leagues actively
sought to implement black citizenship through a number of activities,
ranging from advocating suffrage, to leading protests against segregated
street cars, to organizing state black conventions, to assisting the poor
and helping establish schools.75 The Georgia Equal Rights Association
had been established by the Georgia Freedmen’s Convention with the
purposes of securing equal rights, aiding the poor, and promoting
education for African Americans throughout Georgia.76
These
associations often had close ties with the Freedmen’s Bureau; Georgia’s
association was headed by a former officer of the Georgia division of the

74. In November 1865, the National Equal Rights League held its first meeting in Cleveland.
See 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890, supra note 45, at 40. The Pennsylvania Convention was itself the
Annual Meeting of the Pennsylvania State Equal Rights League. Id. at 132. In Georgia, the
convention that met in January, 1866 referred in its opening to the Georgia Equal Rights
Association. Id. at 232.
75. FONER, supra note 2, at 64; JONATHAN M. BRYANT, HOW CURIOUS A LAND: CONFLICT
AND CHANGE IN GREENE COUNTY, GEORGIA, 1850-1885, 104-118 (1996) (discussing activities of
Equal Rights Associations in Georgia). On the Union Leagues, see generally MICHAEL W.
FITZGERALD, THE UNION LEAGUE MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP SOUTH: POLITICS AND AGRICULTURAL
CHANGE DURING RECONSTRUCTION (1989).
76. BRYANT, supra note 75. Bryant depicts the efforts of the Equal Rights Association to
fight violence and unjust legal treatment in Greene County and throughout Georgia after the war.
Id. at 104-11, 113-18. See also FONER, supra note 2, at 117 (describing the “Georgia Equal Rights
and Educational Association”).
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Freedmen’s Bureau.77 Equal Rights Associations thus combined the
ideals and personnel from the black conventions with the governmental
support and personnel of the federal government. Such organizations,
while partly political, were also general social service operations
designed to implement more fully freedom and citizenship within the
black communities of the South. This was, quite simply, civil society
writ small, a localized and focused effort to bring political claims to
citizenship down to the personal, local, and immediate level for many
blacks throughout the south. What is particularly impressive about this
movement is the combination of speed and breadth by which the
movement made its way from national conventioneering to local
political and social organizing, a movement that could only happen if it
was coming from the ground up as well as the top down and by a
combination of political and social service activity.78 The activities of
Union Leagues, Equal Rights Associations, and numerous other black
social groups were as much civic duties—burial of the dead, education
and literacy, coordination of religious services—as they were political.79
The activities of the Associations and Leagues also achieved
another function: they were a means of the type of dignity-claiming
activity essential to democratic citizenship. As Michael Fitzgerald has
argued, Union League activity, along with other mass actions by black
citizens, “were . . . assertions of self-respect,” public statements of
dignity, equality, and citizenship.80 When blacks acted collectively
throughout the urban centers of the south to challenge segregation in
1867—longshoremen’s strikes in the port cities, other strikes in
Richmond and Selma, streetcar boycotts in Mobile—there was a
fundamental claim of full citizenship being made.81 And for black
citizens who were both claiming and re-defining citizenship, civil,
political, and social equality were part of this citizenship package.
It should not be surprising that a more radical engagement with
civil society took place through the Equal Rights Associations and
Union Leagues than had been expressed at the black conventions of
1865 and 1866. The conventions largely advocated a moderate form of
civil society and civil and political rights. While they understood the

77. BRYANT, supra note 75, at 104.
78. See, e.g., FITZGERALD, supra note 75, at 117 (noting “interconnection between political
insurgency and labor concerns in League-sponsored mass activity”).
79. See generally 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 45; 1 PROCEEDINGS, 1865-1890,
supra note 45.
80. Id. at 127-28.
81. Foner, supra note 48, at 874.
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combination of rights more organically than did congressional leaders,
blacks at the conventions often echoed the free labor ideals being
articulated by white Republicans in the North.82 What developed more
fully in the ensuing years of Reconstruction was a recognition of the
active aspects of politically engaged citizenship and the need for federal
and other governmental protections for the free exercise of citizenship.83
That this realization took place on the ground indicates just how
complicated and embedded the resistance to equal citizenship was; it
also shows exactly why it is critical for civil society to be grounded
locally as well as organized nationally. Moreover, the experiences of the
associations and leagues in working with the federal government
through the Freedmen’s Bureau left African Americans and some local
white Republicans with a firmer understanding of the importance of
governmental supports for the activities of civil society and its
nongovernmental associations.
The more politicized and statist understanding of civil society that
arose in the black public sphere also came about because of the
remarkable participation of black citizens in local, state, and federal
government in the years of congressional Reconstruction, beginning in
what Eric Foner has described as the annus mirabilis of 1867.84 As
African Americans gained more power, they both learned the importance
of governmental action and, in the face of increased white hostility in
other spheres—economic oppression, physical violence, etc.—they also
recognized the essential nature of governmental power in combating
racial oppression in civil society.85 That is, blacks learned that the state
itself was an essential instrument of equal citizenship because civil
society itself allowed for the perpetuation of racial norms.
The importance of the state in black republican views of civil
society was reflected in the actual activities pursued by Reconstruction
legislators and governments in southern states with substantial black
participation for the brief period from 1867 through 1874.86 It was in
this time that several southern legislatures adopted desegregation laws,
asserting a right to open and equal access to public accommodations.87
The effort to desegregate streetcars and public events began with black
and white civil rights protests, including boycotts and sit-ins, in the
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
FONER, supra note 2, at 282.
Id.
See infra notes 87-93.
FONER, supra note 29, at 878-80; FONER, supra note 2, at 346-92.
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antebellum north.88 This movement continued in the postbellum south,
with streetcar lines in New Orleans and Charleston changing
segregationist policies in the face of these protests.89 In combination
with the more radical white and black republicans of the north,
particularly centered in Massachusetts, southern state legislatures
followed with new laws desegregating public accommodations.90 As
Eric Foner observes, the effort to pass laws desegregating public
accommodations, including common carriers, places of amusement, and
even businesses licensed by the state, at first met with overwhelming
opposition from white Republicans and failed to pass, but as blacks
gained more political power and prowess, they were able to persuade
enough whites to achieve passage of the laws in several southern
states.91 Legislatures with substantial black participation also produced
an activist state in terms of the range of services provided, particularly to
the poor.
Legislatures funded medical care, legal assistance,
orphanages, and of course schools.92 Reconstruction legislatures also
enacted some laws protecting laborers, including giving workers a first
lien on an employer’s property.93 Government, under this vision,
worked to produce equal citizenship both by pursuing desegregation of
basic governmental functions and by providing governmental services to
all races, even if often in a de facto segregated manner, in a way that
began to look like the provision of social rights and privileges that would
not be more fully developed, in practice and in political theory, until the
20th Century.
III. IMPORTANCE OF THE STATE AND PROBLEMS OF A BIFURCATED
CIVIL SOCIETY
Even if we can find in the Reconstruction era evidence of a black
civil society and public sphere that developed citizenship ideas and
practices and moved the concept of citizenship beyond the more narrow
confines articulated by congressional Republicans in 1865 and 1866, the
fact remains that the ideal of democratic citizenship only appeared
fleetingly during that period and was violently and systematically
suppressed thereafter. What are we to make, therefore, of the historical
88. See, e.g., Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and
Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283, 1342 (1996).
89. FONER, supra note 2, at 281-82.
90. Massachusetts passed the first major state desegregation law. FONER, supra note 2, at 28.
91. Id. at 370-71.
92. Id. at 368.
93. Id. at 373.
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denial of equal, democratic citizenship from about 1876 through at least
the 1970s, a denial whose effects are felt very profoundly still?
On one level we can see in the loss of the possibilities that began
budding during Reconstruction the critical importance of federal
supports for citizenship. The Supreme Court played its part in the
demise of federal support for federal citizenship, with decisions such as
The Slaughter-House Cases94 and the Civil Rights Cases,95 which
converted federal citizenship into a legal chimera and incapacitated
congressional authority to define and implement citizenship through
very narrow and formalistic readings of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whereas occasional political will at the federal level had led to the
federal suppression of the Ku Klux Klan in the early 1870s—largely
through the coordinated efforts of the newly minted Department of
Justice and the military—the loss of that will and the eventual
acceptance by the Republican party of an accommodation with the white
south effectively eliminated the main means of opposing a violent
overthrow of democratic government.96 The “Redemption” of the south
by white Democrats shows how fragile civil and political citizenship can
be when it is confronted with persistent violent opposition without the
protection of the government. One of the most important basic rights
cited by the South Carolina black convention was the protection by the
government, both by law and by force.97 Absent such protection, absent
the countervailing force represented by the state, civil society simply
cannot develop, at least not in an integrative and open manner. While
more recent analyses of civil society in the context of twentieth century
totalitarian and authoritarian states highlights the problem of the overly
repressive state,98 the creation of the firmly Jim Crow south reveals how
the removal of state power can also destroy the freedom and other

94. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
95. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
96. FONER, supra note 2, at 454-59. For a history of the prosecution of the Klan in this
period, see William S. McFeely, Amos T. Akerman: The Lawyer and Racial Justice, in REGION,
RACE, AND RECONSTRUCTION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF C. VANN WOODWARD 395 (J. Morgan
Kousser & James M. McPherson eds., 1982).
97. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 284-304.
98. See, e.g., David A. Crocker, Civil Society and Transitional Justice, in CIVIL SOCIETY,
DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC RENEWAL, supra note 21, at 375; CIVIL SOCIETY AND POLITICAL CHANGE
IN ASIA: EXPANDING AND CONTRACTING DEMOCRATIC SPACE (Muthiah Alagappa ed., 2004).
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benefits of civil society, especially when practices of subordination are
allowed to operate on civil society.99
However, it must also be noted that the eventual dominance of Jim
Crow occurred through the state, that is, through the instrumentality of
state and local governments. It was most clearly the desire of white
Democrats to control the state apparatus; the point was to control state
government and to keep the federal government from interfering on
behalf of black citizens.100 That this means of control could only be
effectuated through the combined use of private violence and a cover of
state legitimacy did not change the fact that the state was a significant
player. Thus the critical problem, in the context of postwar white
supremacy, was the loss of competing state organizations. As would be
the case in the modern civil rights movement, implementation of
citizenship, and the reconstruction of American civil society, required a
vibrant, active, and competitive federal structure.
What happened to civil society during this period is also instructive.
With the loss of state protection for black participation in and
constructions of civil society, black citizens had to create more defined
and cohesive enclaves of oppositional civil society.101
White
supremacists still strove to attack instantiations of successful black civil
society—Jim Crow violence was often directed against black businesses,
black property owners, black civil associations, black schools, etc.102—
but the ability of black communities to sustain themselves, to educate
their youth, to acquire some level of financial support, and to sustain
voluntary and religious organizational structures that could support
resistance is a remarkable testament to the capacity of enclaves or
counterspheres to exist and develop.103 The problem, however, was that
the development of such enclaves, in a closed civil society that was
rigidly bifurcated and insufficiently porous, meant that the ideals of
democratic citizenship, the ideals expressed, albeit differently, in both
white Republican and black ideology from Reconstruction, ideals of a
99. For my own analysis of the operation of Jim Crow on civil society, see James W. Fox Jr.,
Intimations of Citizenship: Repressions and Expressions of Equal Citizenship in the Era of Jim
Crow, 50 HOWARD L. J. 113 (2006).
100. Id. at 135-37; 152-61.
101. Id. at 161-188.
102. See, e.g., LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND: BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROW, 150-67 (1998).
103. See, e.g., Fredrick C. Harris, Will the Circle be Unbroken? The Erosion and
Transformation of African-American Civic Life, in CIVIL SOCIETY, DEMOCRACY, AND CIVIC
RENEWAL, supra note 21, at 317. Harris focuses more on the middle-to-late-20th century, but his
analysis of the role of segregation-era black civil society applies quite well here.
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more universal citizenship that allowed for open access to all the
“appliances” of civil society, could not in fact take place. Instead, what
developed was, on the one hand, a false universal seen in the conversion
of free labor ideology to a freedom of contract regime that privileged
white supremacist, male capitalism as itself a universalized reality in the
public sphere,104 and, on the other, an aggressively exclusionary public
sphere and uncivil society where the borderlands were patrolled with
violence against the incursion of labor, nonwhites, and women.105
Jeffrey Alexander, in analyzing how Jim Crowism affected and infected
the promise of civil society, argues (based in part on Houston Baker’s
analysis) that white America’s creation of itself as a rational and “civil”
or “civilized” society depended in fundamental ways on the
simultaneous subordination of blacks and the imagining of blacks as
inherently uncivil and uncivilized.106 Thus white civil society itself
became a distorted inversion, at once proclaiming its own universality
while also depicting this universal as set against racial exclusion.
The response to this, as we have seen, was for black citizens to
create a countersphere, or black civil society. Although Alexander fails,
I think, to account for the development of civil society within black
southern society prior to the 1920s (he focuses mainly on the
development of particularly urban aspect of black civil society after
World War I),107 the basic point he makes that it was the discourses and
institutions and cultural reproductions within black civil society that
produced many of the possibilities of a unifying civil society, or what he
calls civil repair is, I think, important.108 Once civil society was firmly
divided with the ending of Reconstruction and creation of Jim Crow by
about 1900, it would be primarily through the counterspheres—spheres

104. This, essentially, is the regime represented by the Supreme Court’s fin-de-siècle
jurisprudence simultaneously upholding the activist state actions of white supremacy and uprooting
state protections of labor in order to protect industrial capitalism. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163
U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kan. 347 U.S.
483 (1954), and Lochner v. People of the State of N.Y., 198 U.S. 45 (1905), overruled in part by
Day-Brite Lighting Inc. v. State of Mo., 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
105. Alexander sees this move to force and violence as the product of an insufficiently
developed civil sphere. ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 266. I would attribute it at least as much to
failures of the state—in this instance the federal government—as I would to failures of either
Alexander’s civil sphere or civil society more generally. I should note, however, that Alexander’s
civil sphere seems to include at least portions of the state, such as law and legal systems, which
bring my view closer to his.
106. ALEXANDER, supra note 16, at 269-73.
107. See id. at 293-391.
108. Id. at 265-385 (discussing race and civil repair).
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in the black community, the women’s suffrage movement, immigrant
communities, and the labor movement—that a reconstruction of civil
society could be fueled. In fact it is a remarkable feature of black civil
society, from Reconstruction through the Civil Rights Movement, that
one of the, but certainly not the only, dominant discourses was a
universalizing, idealized vision of civil society and a surprisingly
hopeful view of citizenship as a promise realizable through the rule of
law.109 As we saw above with respect to the period of Reconstruction,
black civil society throughout Jim Crow contained and nurtured a
discourse of civil society that was both universalizing and critical of the
dominant, but uncivil white society.110
IV. LESSONS AND CAUTIONS
The initial experiences of African Americans in claiming and
creating citizenship after the establishment of formal citizenship under
the Fourteenth Amendment reveal some important aspects of citizenship,
civil society, and the public sphere. First, it seems clear from the
experiences of black political discourse and the communal engagement
of the convention movement that an alternative public sphere, one
dedicated to the participation of African Americans and to the
expression and development of issues and ideas concerning black
Americans was critical to the creation of some level of democratic and
equal citizenship during Reconstruction. The efforts to include suffrage
within a basic definition of citizenship would have been far less
effective, and far easier for whites to sidestep, were it not for the
persistent emphasis of blacks enacting their citizenship claims.
Furthermore, the ability of African Americans to engage in their
own public spheres to develop discourse—an ability made possible, we
should note, by the first-order legal rights of free assembly and free
109. See, e.g., ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF
1921, RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION 79 (2002) (discussing the importance of law,
constitutionalism, and equal citizenship in the Oklahoma black community of the 1910s). Brophy
accurately depicts how this more liberal vision co-existed alongside a more militant position
favoring forceful self-defense supported in part by black soldiers returning from World War I—both
positions being united, in important ways, by claims of and to full citizenship. Houston A. Baker,
Jr. makes a similar point about how, in his own experience, black civil society, and the black public
sphere, sustained a spirit of civil repair: “[T]he Constitution of the United States and the American
national flag were valued sites of patriotism and pride for the black public sphere.” Houston A.
Baker, Jr., Critical Memory and the Black Public Sphere, in THE BLACK PUBLIC SPHERE: A PUBLIC
CULTURE BOOK 23 (The Black Public Sphere Collective ed., 1995).
110. On the sustaining of a constitutional discourse within one black community during Jim
Crow, see BROPHY, supra note 109.
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speech that had been denied in the antebellum South—made the
discourse that took place in the authoritative public sphere, the one in
which legal and policy changes are made, that much richer. This history
indicates that some version of multiple or counter-spheres can be
important to enriching democratic citizenship and democratic decisionmaking in a pluralist society. It is also important to any understanding
of how people can claim and define their own citizenship and thus
convert mere citizenship into democratic citizenship. These benefits
were seen in the biracial legislatures of Reconstruction, where the
discourses of multiple public spheres could engage each other in a larger
public sphere and help produce a range of governmental programs and
laws which accounted for a richer, more varied type of citizenship than
one finds in earlier, uniracial debates even within the Republican party.
Second, black citizens’ engagement with these political issues was
done initially as an act of political citizenship prior to the formal grant
of political citizenship through suffrage. While legal or civil citizenship
rights, in the sense of rights to assembly and speech, may well have been
necessary for the development of the black public sphere; the right to
suffrage was not. Indeed, the opposite may have been true: it was the
discourse developed in the black public sphere which insisted on
suffrage and which helped prepare African Americans for effective
political activity once suffrage came. In this sense, while the vote may
well have been fundamental to retaining effective implementation of
other rights—as John Mercer Langston, Frederick Douglass,111 and
others argued—actions within the black public sphere and civil society
may themselves have been fundamental to the establishment of suffrage,
even if temporarily. The relationship between black civil society/public
sphere and political citizenship was symbiotic, not a progressive move
through stages.
Moreover, as the legislative agendas of the
Reconstruction legislatures point out, even social rights—the rights to
education and public services—began developing in this context as
well.112 Reconstruction reveals that the full citizenship develops in a
more organic and less legalistic way than is conceived of by common
constitutional understandings of citizenship.
Third, it is important to recognize how delegates to black
conventions talked about civil society in a way at once embracing
111. E.g., LANGSTON, supra note 56; WILLIAM S. MCFEELEY, FREDERICK DOUGLASS 246
(1991) (discussing Douglass’s support for the vote as essential for the protection of other rights);
Fox, supra note 29, at 469-71 (discussing Langston and Douglass).
112. FONER, supra note 2, at 364-79 (discussing range of state-supported activities and projects
initiated and developed by Reconstruction state governments).
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individualized rights to labor, contract, and property consistent with
white Republican ideals, and asserting a communal character to the
establishment and development of the citizens for whom these rights
were to operate. Theorists of civil society often claim as one of its
virtues that it bridges the individual and communal theories of
democratic society;113 historically, it was in the counterspheres or
alternate civil societies of the nineteenth century in which such claims
were most seriously and consistently developed, as evident in the black
convention movement (one can make a similar case for the women’s
suffrage movement of the period and, I think, for some aspects of the
labor movement a few years later). Contrary to some civil society
revivalists who jump directly from Tocqueville and the Age of Jackson
to late-twentieth century neighborhood associations with a curious
inattentiveness to what happened between,114 the most instructive and
constructive source for how civil society can build citizenship and
engage social-moral issues comes from the social movements that
sought to realize the democratic citizenship promised of the
Reconstruction Amendments.115
Fourth, the broader social and cultural experience of black citizens
after the war reveal aspects of civil society that are essential to account
for in any decent conception of democratic citizenship. In thinking
about what democratic citizenship can mean, and in thinking about how
efforts were made to try to achieve it in the past, it should be
remembered that full citizenship implies access to a range of social and
cultural activities and communities. The statements from the South
Carolina convention about needing access to all avenues and appliances
of citizenship reflect an important indication of how civil society in its
broadest form, from voluntary associations to families to religious
communities to economic organizations, would be necessary for

113. E.g., Rosenblum & Post, supra note 17, at 3-4.
114. E.g., Jean Bethke Elshtain, Will the Real Civil Society Please Stand Up?, 75 CHI-KENT L.
REV. 583, 583-84 (identifying individual moral leaders in American history, but ignoring social
movements in civil society). Robert Putnam is much more attentive to the historical development of
voluntary associations, include within black communities. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING
ALONE 390-91 (2000). However, because Putnam tends to view voluntary associationalism as
something unique or separate from social movements and group political consciousness, his analysis
misses the importance of the connections between civil society organizations and the public sphere.
See also Gerald Gamm & Robert D. Putnam, The Growth of Voluntary Associations in America,
1840-1940, 29 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY HIST. 511 (1999). On the problem of Putnam’s failure to
account for the public sphere, see generally Cohen, supra note 21.
115. See supra Part I.
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developing citizenship, both individually and communally.116
Citizenship, as a concept, should allow for consideration of these aspects
of civil society, for it is in the nongovernmental spheres of civil society
where the citizen can be made and supported. This point is particularly
crucial for theorists and advocates on the left, who can easily succumb to
an excessive focus on state action and can see social movements as
largely divorced from their communal roots, warts and all. The nongovernmental communal organizations that support civil society are also
potential sources of exclusion and demarcation on their own and can
replicate other subordinations and/or serve to divide social movements
in ways advantageous to those seeking to deny full citizenship to
subordinated groups and people.
This is arguably one of the
consequences of the insistence on citizenship as a male sphere, as an
expression of manhood, during Reconstruction, and is a crucial lesson in
the dangers of both the civil sphere and of closed counterspheres.
Fifth, it should not be forgotten that civil society and government
are best seen as a two-way street. Just as black civil society fed into
governmental activities and conceptions of citizenship, the state was also
a necessary part of securing the vibrancy of civil society. It was, finally,
the loss of governmental support, in the form of federal troops and legal
actions, that made possible the end of Reconstruction and the rise of a
fully bifurcated and subordinated civil society.117 While the church, and
family, and other aspects of black civil society could serve as sites and
sources for resistance to Jim Crow, it was the absence of state support
that made this enclave resistance necessary.
So where does this take us with respect to my initial questions
about defining democratic citizenship and the possible ways of thinking
about constitutional citizenship? One answer surely is that it is deeply
problematic to think of citizenship in a restricted, legalistic manner
which would search for formal definitions and content in antebellum
case law and Attorney General opinions. If the experiences of the
postbellum period tell us anything, they tell us that citizenship was being
claimed at least as much as it was being granted. More importantly, the
people claiming citizenship were not bound by classical liberal ideas of
legal citizenship and legal status for individuals, although those ideas
were important.
Rather, they saw citizenship as a process of
engagement by individuals with a variety of social, political, and legal
groups or communities. The development of citizenship through the
116. 2 PROCEEDINGS, 1840-1865, supra note 54, at 286-304.
117. BRYANT, supra note 75, at 104.
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“appliances” of civilized society came to be seen as an engagement with
many spheres of civil society itself, spheres ranging from legal to
political to voluntary organizations to economic enterprises to education
to religion to family and kinship. Legal and legislative action supporting
citizenship were critical, but as the failures of Reconstruction showed,
they were plainly insufficient. Voluntary and community associations
provided critical loci for protest and organization, but they too were
insufficient on their own. Similarly, access to education, enjoyment of
religious association and exercise, and a variety of political engagements
were also necessary, but not sufficient, in forming successful resistance
to denials of citizenship and in efforts to claim at least some degree of
full citizenship. Only through a complex engagement across all of these
spheres would full democratic citizenship have had a chance to flourish;
and primarily through the combined effort to destroy or constrain
African Americans’ freedom across all these spheres did white
supremacy retain power throughout the South.
This analysis suggests that democratic citizenship, and the
citizenship of inclusion and equality being explored during the initial
implementations of the Fourteenth Amendment, must contain some
degree of recognition of, access to, and support for the variety of spheres
of civil society. To the extent that citizenship is a developmental
concept—and certainly in the transition from bondsmen to freedmen this
was true—it must incorporate some ideas and policies for helping to
create and sustain full citizens. The experiences of Reconstruction also
reveal that this process requires both state-based supports and programs,
and extensive networks of private communal supports. Indeed, the
importance of civil society evident in this period itself indicates that the
separation of state and private spheres is, as many people have argued,
itself problematic, at least to the extent that it posits a hard separation of
the spheres.118 The advantage of civil society and public sphere theory is
precisely its ability to bridge this intersection of state and private in a
way that more accurately captures what happened on the ground during
and after Reconstruction and also permits us to see ways of reconciling
and repairing the contradictions of equal citizenship ideas.

118. Although a topic for another day, this myth of separation of the private civil sphere from
the public governmental sphere was one of the greatest legal-constitutional roadblocks to equal
citizenship erected by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases and related opinions.

